

BOKO-HARAM INSURGENCE IN NIGERIA: THE CHALLENGES AND LESSONS

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Abstract

The terrorist acts of the Boko-Haram since 2009 have created a state of palpable fear in Nigeria and beyond, while the helpless posture of governments is worrisome. The study examines the growth of the sect, the efforts of government in addressing the challenges and the implications. The study is descriptive and data obtained from secondary sources. It was found that the insurgence was a manifestation of frustration on account of national political, religious and economic systems while the institutional mechanism adopted in managing the crisis was defective. The study concludes that the challenges are not insurmountable but a reflection of a weak state. It recommends the adoption of proactive security measures, peace approach to security and policies that equitably address poverty and unemployment. Lastly, the southern states governments are to pay more attention to agriculture to reduce over-dependence on northern sources particularly in periods of crises, disaster or crop failure.

1. Introduction

Terrorism is globally becoming a household word as there is no nation that is completely absolved from its effect. Globalization has significantly influenced the spate of terrorism as the event in one part of the globe has direct or an indirect effect on others. This explains why Horne (2002) in Rourke (2008) observes that war, terrorism and other forms of transnational political violence are in many ways more threatening today than ever before as civilian casualty has been on increase. It is however difficult to evolve a single definition for the term “terrorism”. The difficulty emanates from the lack of consensus or unified perspective among nations or scholars as to what could be regarded as terrorist act. Hence, terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and inexcusable abomination since it is a function of whose point of view is being represented (<http://www.terrorism-research.com/>).

Kydd & Walter (2006) define terrorism as actions focusing on harming some people in order to create fear in others by targeting civilians and facilities or system on which civilians rely. However, the scope of the operation of the Boko-Haram sect has gone beyond civilian targets including Police and Military establishments. This paper acknowledges that discussions on the subject matter might be value laden since it is a function of individual’s perceptions. However, for the purpose of this study, terrorism is viewed as violence perpetrated by individuals within or outside the government circle that is specifically directed against civilian or government institutions as a way of calling attention to perceived real or imaginary injustices in a clandestine manner. This definition largely captures the modus operandi of the

Boko-Haram sect as a domestic terrorist organisation. The challenges posed by Boko-Haram sect on the security of lives and property in Nigeria and the implications on corporate existence of Nigeria as well as its image internationally motivate this study. The paper is descriptive and the materials obtained from secondary sources including relevant text books, journals and newspapers.

2. Statement of Problem

The increasing spread of nefarious activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria and the destruction of lives and property is a serious issue that could not be dismissed with a wave of hand. The group caught the attention of international community following series of violent attacks in Nigeria since July 2009 and specifically with the attack of the United Nations building at Abuja in 2011. The sect, having no clear structure or known chain of command was responsible conservatively for the death of over 1200 people (Jimmoh, 2011). A major function of a good government is to guarantee the security of lives and property. This explains why the early philosophers observe that people give up part of their rights to a sovereign leader who is charged with the responsibility of ensuring their security. The demonstrated inability of the Federal Government to curb the insurgence in spite of repeated assurance motivates this study.

3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The broad objective of this paper is to examine the challenges posed by Boko-Haram insurgence and the lesson the nation can learn from it. Other objectives include:

- I. To examine the factors that encouraged the growth and the spread of Boko-Haram sect.
- II. To critically evaluate the government efforts in addressing the issues associated the insurgence.
- III. To analyze the implications of Boko Haram insurgence.

4. Theoretical Framework

Acts of terrorism are manifestations of unresolved conflicts and the inability of the government to overcome the challenges are reflections that the root cause(s) of the conflicts are not identified and therefore the correct mechanism could not be adopted to manage or resolve it. Scholars have propounded so many theoretical models to explain the prevalence of terrorism but for the purpose of this study, a combination of cognitive dissonance, frustration aggression and asset to liability theories are adopted.

Adekanye (2007) enumerates three set of factors that largely explain the processes that metamorphose into conflict situation that can as well lead to terrorism and these are the structural background conditions, precipitating and triggers factors. Festinger (1951) developed a theory about communication's social influences, referred to as cognitive dissonance which is one of the most important psychological concepts that shed light on terrorist behaviour. Cunningham, Jr. (2003) observes that:

Men prefer a situation of stability in respect of values, behavior and their environmental conditions When people experience a difference between what they perceive and what they desire (cognitive dissonance), they seek to reduce this dissonance by reducing this gap through actions, filtering information or altering perceptions.

Cognitive dissonance is therefore experienced whenever there is a discrepancy between *preferred value and actual value states*. Such a situation has the tendency to produce hatred, anxiety, fear

and the desire to hurt or eliminate the source. The discrepancies could manifest within economic, social, cultural political and religious spheres as these issues form the micro level of analysis that could be regarded as the structural background conditions operating at individual level.

The predisposition factors to Boko-Haram insurgence could therefore be located largely in the real or perceived discrepancy between the preferred way of life (to maintain the sanctity of orthodox Islam) and the actual state of their existence (secular state) that influence the dissonance. The voice of the few elements that initially reacted to the perceived dissonance is what the issue at stake requires to garner popular support. In effect, the personal dissonance grows to become group level grievances and discontentment. By this means, it transforms from a micro into macro-level phenomenon that agrees with what Gurr, (1970) refers to as relative deprivation and largely provides explanation to what this study refers to as precipitating or accelerating factors.

The shared view by the sect and other recruited members of the larger society provides a cheap platform for mobilization of groups for political action that can lead to popular uprisings, riots and revolutions. In this specific instance, it develops to terrorism as the movement enjoys widespread overt or covert support among the disgruntled elements within the society (Volkan, 1990:31). The goal of such individuals is to remove the hindrances through whichever methods that Cunningham (2003) refers to as maladaptive means. Maladaptive means could include forming a terrorist organization and carrying out terrorist acts.

It needs be acknowledged that not in all instances of cognitive dissonance or everybody that experiences it as well as deprived individuals or groups may choose to commit terrorist acts. Some people may suffer in silence or adopt constitutional means to address their grievances. Galtung, (1969) in addition notes that the theories hypothesize the presence of significant socio-economic indicators that can serve as breeding grounds for terrorists, but they do not answer the question of why some people or groups in the same structurally disadvantaged situations choose terrorism and others do not.

As a catalytic factor, Cunningham (2003) discusses *asset to liability shift theory* which serves as a root of terrorist strategy. The theory assumes governments view states and local government areas within its jurisdiction as assets that must be defended against internal or external aggression. It goes further to state that acts of terrorism will cost the government valuable lives and money in defending these assets against a sustained terrorist campaign as experienced with the Boko-Haram. The theory assumes that after the government suffers significant losses, the asset will become instead, a liability and the government will decide to forfeit the asset and cut their losses. Hence, the goal of the terrorist in this instance is to destabilize the country and make it 'ungovernable' as this could lead to a situation of break-up of the country or imposition of Islamic ways of life. This is anchored on the assumption that during anti-terrorist campaigns government will overreact and become oppressive in order to combat the terrorists as this will expose the weakness of the government to the populace like the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the Boko-Haram sect. This in turn will make the members of the public withdraw their support for the government and develop sympathy for the sect. Though the theory had been criticized but it reflects significantly the philosophy behind Boko-Haram sect and to a large extent while the governments have been unable to overcome the challenges posed by the sect.

4. Literature Review

The term 'terrorism' was coined from terror derived from a Latin verb '*terrere*' that means 'to frighten'. Alao (2011:18) cited Campell (2001) and observes that *terror cimbricus* was a panic and state of emergency in Rome in response to the approach of warriors of the Cimri tribe in 105 BC.

In modern time it has been adopted to mean a wide range of deployment of force largely targeted at civilian population by disgruntled elements within the society to direct the attention of government to their plight or to force a change of government. The difficulty associated with evolving an acceptable definition of terrorism leads Hoffman (1998:3) to observe that

If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism.

Regardless of the problem associated with the definition, certain attributes of terrorism manifest in bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hostage situations and hijackings.

The study agrees with Cunningham (2003) that a wide variety of actors from individuals (Carlos Illych Ramirez -the Jackal; the Unabomber) to groups (Tamil Tigers, Provisional IRA, Hamas, Boko Haram) to institutions (Gestapo, KGB, SAVAK) and finally to governments and states (the Taliban,) practice what we define as *terrorism*. The involvement of America in Vietnam, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya and Egypt among others was seen as terrorist act by Ogunsola (2011:12). This goes further to justify that the definition is a function of individual perception. Hence, terrorism is not limited to non-state actors. It explains why there is no unified perspective of what terrorism is and led Sick in Kegley, (1990:52) to note that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'.

The fact that state and non-state actors engage in acts of terrorism inform the position of Falk in

Kegley,(1990:39) that:

"It is futile and hypocritical self-deception to suppose that we can use the word terrorism to establish a double standard pertaining to the use of political violence. ... Terrorism, then, is used here to designate any type of political violence that lacks an adequate moral and legal justification, regardless of whether the actor is a revolutionary group or a government".

It is therefore essential to note that the modus operandi of the Boko-Haram slightly differ from what is traditionally known of terrorists in line with the five characteristics identified by Cunningham (2003). First, the victims of terrorist attacks are usually civilians and not combatants. Terrorists do not usually target armed police or soldiers who have the capability to fight back. Recent attacks by the sect revealed that they attacked Police Headquarters at Abuja in 2011 and other security formations. For instance, on June 27, 2012 a police station was attacked at Gulak in Adamawa State as reported by the News Agency of Nigeria. Also, following the shooting and killing of twenty Deeper Life worshippers at Okene on August 6, 2012, a distress call was received by the Joint Task force from the same location the next day. On getting close to the destination, the terrorist shot and killed two soldiers.

Second, the perpetrators are not recognized combatants. They do not carry arms openly nor do they wear recognizable uniforms or insignia prior to or during attacks. The Boko-Haram of recent engages the military in direct shoot out and prolonged battle as witnessed in Kano and Maiduguri. The Boko-Haram attacked a police station in Nigeria's northern state of Bauchi on 26 July 2009. The incident led to a four-day armed struggle between State Security forces and members of the militant group, spreading to three other states (Yobe, Kano and Borno) and leaving as many as 800 dead (<http://af.reuters.com/article/NigerianNews/idaf14385708200009080804>). This type of confrontation is not characteristic of terrorist group.

Like other terrorists, they do not recognize the rules and laws of war as their acts were in violations of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (1949). Also,

terrorist acts are by nature symbolic and not instrumental as the act itself may not be sufficient to bring about the desired change. The immediate victims of attacks were not necessarily the intended targets. For example, though the sect attacked churches and the UN building, the intended target was the wider audience. The reaction of the wider audience to the state of insecurity, fear and terror, are required by them to influence governments and citizenry in order to achieve their goals. Extant literature however notes that terrorism is motivated by larger political causes and the acts are symbolically carried out in order to further that cause.

However, Schulze (2009) notes that Boko-Haram is ideologically isolated and lacks popular support from the population and Muslim leaders. Though this is contentious, she buttressed her position with the condemnation of the movement by Islamic bodies like the Nigerian umbrella body of Muslims, Jama'atul Nasril Islam (JNI) that categorically dissociated Islam from the activities of Boko-Haram. Such a conclusion needs to be approached with caution, while it is difficult to believe that Christians will be sponsoring the bombing of fellow believers, this study argues that highly placed and wealthy individuals not yet identified due to security lapses might be bankrolling the sect and provide channels for easy passage of ammunitions and explosives.

5. Discussion

5.1 The Growth of the Sect

Boko Haram is not the first Islamic fundamentalist sect in Nigeria to adopt violence as a weapon of operation. In the 1970s and 1980s, one Mohammed Marwa, that was widely acknowledged as dangerous to peace and stability of the nation formed the sect that was known as Maitatsine. He instigated riots in the country which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people as this explains why some analysts view Boko-Haram as an extension of the Maitatsine riots (Johnson, 2011). "Boko-Haram" was derived from Hausa and Arabic words. "*Boko*" in Hausa means "western education" and "*Haram*" an Arabic word means "sin" (Obinna, (2011) and Sani, (2011). The Economist (2011) among others note that the term means "western education is forbidden" is due to the strong opposition to anything Western, as it is believed by the sect to have corrupting influence on Muslims.

The original name for the sect is The Group of Al-Sunna for Preaching and Jihad, as this is the English translation of *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad*. It was founded as an indigenous Salafist group, turning itself into a Salafist Jihadist group in 2009. The group was founded in 2001 by late Muhammad Yusuf, in the town of Maiduguri. The residents of Maiduguri adopted the term "*Boko-Haram*" for the sect. In 2004, Yusuf relocated to his home state, Yobe and settled in the village called Kanamma near the Niger border according to Al Jazeera (2009).

The group/sect is believed not to be against Christian alone but supports opposition to the Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria. The group largely conducted its operations peacefully between 2002 and 2008. In 2009, based on security reports, the Nigerian government started investigating the activities of the sect. This was on account of security reports that its members embarked on stocking arms and arming themselves as reported in the Guardian Newspaper (2009). It was believed that the government initially ignored the reports on the sect prior to 2009. Since 2011, with the bombing of United Nations headquarters in Abuja, the sect has been seen by global community as a terrorist group.

The sect believes that the notion of a spherical Earth is contrary to Islamic teaching and should be rejected. The Darwinian evolution and the concept of rain originating from water evaporated by the sun were incompatible with its teaching as reported in the BBC News of July 26 & 28, 2009. Before his death, Yusuf reiterated the group's objective of changing the current education system

and rejecting democracy in his interview with Al Jazeera on July, 27 2009. Also, the assumption that the crises have remained localized in the past and haven't had the potential to turn into a full-scale national crisis is rejected by this study based on recent attacks in Nigeria as witness in June, 2012 at Kaduna when Christian youth embarked on retaliatory moves.

The members of the sect were indoctrinated to exist in the physical but the ultimate is metaphysical, hence, wealth and the allurements of this world are of no importance as they were prepared for death anytime. The sequence of events could have informed the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General Carter F. Ham in September 2011 to list Boko Haram as one of the three African terrorist groups. The others are - Shabab of Somalia, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region. He observes that they have "*very explicitly and publicly voiced intent to target Westerners, and the U.S. specifically*" and that he was concerned with "*the voiced intent of the three organizations to more closely collaborate and synchronize their efforts.*" (Mojeed, Musikilu; Eric Schmitt, 2011).

This explains why the decision by the US government to name 3 leaders of the sect as global terrorists on June 21, 2012 might be perceived by the group as international recognition rather than condemnation. This poses a serious constraint as a person who is prepared to die for the course he believes in fighting an individual who is not prepared to lose his life. The death of the founder of the sect only provided an impetus for the followers to redouble their dangerous activities.

Dibia, (2012) observes that the police killed Yusuf, the leader of the Boko-Haram sect and went ahead to arrest many of its members, assembled them somewhere in the northern part of Nigeria, shot and killed them one by one. He further notes that this was shown to the whole world by Aljazeera in its television channel and website. Sadly, the government did nothing to condemn or ensure that those responsible for extra-judicial killings were punished. In addition, in order to ensure electoral victory at all cost, desperate northern politicians recruited members of the sect to rig the 2011 elections in their favour but they were dumped after winning the election. The study observed that the aggrieved members of the sect in order to revenge decided to use the guns and bombs procured by the politician to fight them and the government. The sect was believed to enjoy sizeable support from the Northern axis of the country including among security officers, politicians, and jobless youth. Unlike in the Niger-Delta crisis, the Boko- Haram is wrongly believed to consist of faceless individuals that made the effort of the government more or less complex in adopting dialogue strategy. The study however argues that this is due to lack of political will and sincerity on the part of the government to confront the issues involved. The government is also embarking on self-condemnation if faceless individuals could be operating within a nation since 2002 where there are many security outfits. Hence, Soyombo (2012) describes it as an embarrassing lack of intelligence capacity of the government. This scenario might have partly informed the Fund for Peace 2012 report to categorize Nigeria as one of the 10 failed states in Africa and the 14th in the world (Tella, 2012:17).

Since 2009, the death of the leader has led to more violent attacks witnessed on regular basis in churches, security establishments and media organizations with huge human casualty that present the government as helpless and incapable of handling the insurgency. The increasing spread of the insurgency led some political and religious leaders in the north to conclude that the group has now expanded beyond its original religious composition to include not only Islamic militants, but criminal elements and disgruntled politicians as well. Prominent among such individuals and groups from the North are the Sultan of Sokoto, the Governor of Niger State, Dr Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu. The groups include the Coalition of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria (CMCN), the Islamic Circle of North America, the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, the Muslim Council of Britain, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Council on American Islamic Relations.

They have severally condemned the sect and called on them to embrace peace (Jimmoh, 2011 & Oladeji and Agba 2011). However, the calls have not translated to reduction in acts of terrorism. The most disturbing aspect was the interception of a rocket launcher in Bornu State in July, 2012 security measures must be intensified so that chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction will not be introduced by the terrorists Alao (2012).

5.2 A Critical Analysis of the Efforts by the Government to Arrest the Insurgence.

The operation of the Boko-Haram initially was not given a serious attention by the Federal Government prior to 2009 as discussed in the preceding section in spite of various security reports. The reason was believed to have been premised on the assumption that Boko-Haram initially started as an Islamic organization whose teachings were the purification of Islam and it was not the only one with the same objective in the Northern axis of Nigeria. As from 2004, sect was increasingly becoming a source of concern for the government and the effort to tread softly was governed by the need not to turn the issue into religious or ethnic conflict. Egbunik (2012) describes Nigeria as

A plane on autopilot, a battle ground between those who vowed to make the country 'ungovernable' and a government that lacks the courage to put them behind bars. Little wonder that the peace we all crave for may remain an illusion for quite some time.

The immediate past National Security Adviser, General Owoye Andrew Azazi worked with other African governments, European and Middle Eastern governments, and the U.S. government to build cooperation against Boko-Haram. This was based on the assumption that the membership of the sect included volunteers from Chad, Niger among others. Azazi met in 2010 with then CIA Director Leon Panetta and in 2011 with AFRICOM Commander General Ham, and other U.S. officials. He was in the United States when the congressional panel was preparing its report on Boko-Haram as reported in the "Atlantisphere", November 10, 2011. The international cooperation, this study believes have not translated to concrete actions that could have effectively reduced the onslaught of the sect.

In addition, the inability of the government to monitor the conflict dynamics as to locate early warning signs to prevent outbreak of hostility was a serious issue not only in the instance of Boko-Haram but other conflicts that have threatened sustained peace in Nigeria. For instance, Alex (2004) noted that prior to the outbreak of hostilities between the Tiv and Hausa/Fulani in Nasarawa State, the Security agencies since the first half of 2001 had alerted and advised the State Government of the likely threat to peace. It was however found that the failure of the government to act led to the full blown hostilities. Also, the case of Jos crisis was another example of inaction and dereliction of duty by the government and security agencies. Polit (2008:54) notes that since September 1, 2001, the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity personally called the State Police Commissioner's attention and the Government authorities to what they perceived as imminent threats to peace, but unfortunately, the authorities failed to respond. It could therefore be argued that the inability of the policy makers in Nigeria to act promptly and equitably to emerging conflicts constituted a serious challenge to the management of conflicts generally (Alao, 2012).

The usual approach in government circle to achieve peace in Nigeria was the adoption of security approach that this study argues to be very defective. According to Galtung (2010) this manifests in seeing the opposing group (Boko Haram) as an evil party with strong capability and evil intention that best describe the sect, a clear and present danger of violence and the application of sufficient strength to deter or defeat the evil party as these are assumed to produce the needed

security which is considered the best approach to peace. The demonstration of the above found expression in government waking from its slumber in 2009 leading to the arrest of several members of the group largely in Bauchi. This arrest Nossiter, (2009) notes gave birth to violent confrontation between government forces and the sect that led to the deaths of about 700 people.

The challenge therefore is that governments often want the terms of peace agreement to follow strictly his own planned, sealed and delivered agenda that have often been over politicized. It lacks proper diagnosis of the issues involved but direct attention to its suppressions through military might as these have proved to be ineffective. The government often forget or not aware of the fact that socio-political issue cannot be resolved through application of force. What force will only accomplish is the suppression of the conflict, while the perpetrators go underground waiting for the right opportunity to re-emerge like it happened after the extra-judicial killing of the leader of Boko-Haram sect.

This study agrees with Omoregbe and Omohan (2005) that security agencies' intervention was coercive, while their deployment was directed at controlling direct violence. It had been found as rightly noted by Oromareghake and Akpator (2005:601) that:

“The problem with the deployment of security forces that are not backed by intensive mediation effort is that it unnecessarily prolongs the stay of such security forces deployed in different parts of Nigeria”

The operation of security forces often add another dimension of violence as victims that ought to be protected were often subjected to harsh treatment and other forms of abuse as reported among others in the Niger-Delta crisis. At the same time, their presence did not stop the resurgence of violence as widely reported in Jos in 2011 and 2012. Hence, the government may not receive the support of the citizenry in the affected areas as to give them the edge in fighting the terrorists.

Finally, it has been observed that violence often catches the attention of government and the need to ensure security rather than finding lasting solution to problems are the primary considerations. Hence, governments often scratch conflict or contending issues at the surface and leave the fundamental issues unattended to as this with agrees Galtung (2010:25) The issues involved are left unresolved, confused, the conflict arena and the numbers of conflicting parties are reduced to two such as government versus Boko-Haram, ignoring the fact that some of government top functionaries, traditional rulers, business magnets and frustrated politicians are interested parties who may also be serving as truce breaker. This explains why Senator Aliyu Ndume is currently undergoing trial for sponsoring terrorism and a pointer that sufficient facts have not been obtained in respect of those behind the sect. Sad enough, due to lack of proper diagnoses, the causes might be left largely unexplored while the hidden goals of intervening parties ignored. The government fails to critically explore peace proposal and immediate non-violent action could lead to a wrong conclusion that peace has been restored. The resurgence of violence leads to redeployment of force and perpetuating the circle of violence.

The above reveals the weakness of the measures adopted by the government and agrees with Galtung (1966:124) observing that most government efforts at resolving conflict are defective as the peace arrangement is often not seriously projected to dealing with future challenges

5.3 Implication of Boko Haram Insurgence

The implications of multi-dimensional conflicts in Nigeria as well as the fall out of Boko Haram insurgence have left behind an inestimable damage to every facet of life in Nigeria. There is no gaining saying that it has slowed down the national economic growth and development since no

investors would prefer to invest in a crisis ridden nation. It further compounded the problems associated with the relocation of Multinational Companies to safer territories in Africa like Ghana due to infrastructural decay. One of the noticeable effect has been the tendency to worsen unemployment and lead to youth restiveness, thereby making crime a profitable venture and attractive. It has also led to near collapse of tourism industry as the nation loses huge foreign currency that could have accrued from this sector.

In addition, the scourge of the Boko Haram if not checkmated might lead to food scarcity in Nigeria on the long run though a glimpse of such was experienced in July, 2012 when the prices of food items and vegetables skyrocketed in the south. This was as a result of the inability of traders from the north to transport commodities due to general insecurity in the north. The dangerous aspect that has not caught the attention of the government is the nature of migration that is currently experienced in Nigeria for the first time. In this instance, it is not the southerners alone that are migrating from the north but also the northerners on account of insecurity. Most of the migrants from the north are in their productive age and farmer and trades men by profession. This explains why most of the Okada riders in the Western States are of northern extraction. The danger is that they have abandoned their profession (farming) as this will reduce food production and compound the problem of food importation. Currently, Okpaga, Chijioke, and Eme, (2012) observe that Nigeria spends over 10 billion dollars yearly on importation of four food items alone including sugar, wheat and rice. Though President Jonathan said that the situation was unacceptable, but the long run effects of the insurgency have not been given justifiable attention as governments in Nigeria pay lip services to agricultural revolution.

Furthermore, there is no doubt that the migrants will put additional pressure on the host communities in term of infrastructure and security challenges. With the banning of Okada on major roads in places like Lagos, the eastern parts of the nation may not be a viable alternative and there is the tendency that the migrants might be a security threat and take to crime as a means livelihood. More than that, such frustrated elements might easily be influenced to serve as agents for the Boko Haram in the south. Any successful attack by the sect in the south might lead to reprisal, the effect that might not be predictable with respect to corporate existence of Nigeria.

The insurgency has the tendency to lead more Nigerians into poverty. Subair (2012), relying on National Bureau of Statistics estimates using the relative, absolute and dollar-per-day poverty measures, notes that poverty may have further risen slightly to about 71.5 per cent, 61.9 per cent and 62.8 per cent respectively in 2011. If the scourge is not addressed, many able hands will be rendered jobless on account of migration and this will definitely feedback to the challenges imposed by insecurity. In an attempt to address insecurity, there is the tendency for governments to increase its spending on security, while resources could be diverted from socio-economic development programmes that could transform the nation and provide conduit pipe for fraud and misappropriation of fund in the name of security coverage.

Another dimension of the Boko Haram insurgency is the effect on the corporate image of Nigeria within committee of nations. Internationally, the image of the nation is dented while prostitution, crime, drug trafficking, fraud and high level of corruption are the issues that are negatively affecting the reputation of Nigeria and Nigerians anywhere in the World. For a decade, efforts were made without success to rebrand the shattered image of Nigeria. There is no amount of image laundering that can influence the impression of the international community if negative news on a daily basis emanate from the nation.

The activities of the Boko Haram in Nigeria has led to palpable fear among the citizenry and high sense of insecurity due to regular loss of life and damage to properties and Infrastructures on account of bombings and reported cases of assassination. The list of death according to Jimmoh

(2011) was 1400 as at 2011 while Igbokwe (2012) put the figure at about 1500 in the last one year. Okpaga, Chijioke, and Eme, (2012:9-12) gave a summary of terrorist acts perpetrated from July 27, 2009 to February 17, 2012 which is a manifestation of how dangerous the sect is. The implication is that there is general belief that government is helpless and incapable of handling the situation as this has left the populace at the mercy of blood thirsty sect and everybody to himself. Of recent, the attack by the sect had no regard for any establishment including security, international agencies, press, private individuals, emirs, churches and mosques. It has left the impression that nobody is safe while it questioned their avowed commitment to Islamic revival. The experience of Miss Agnes Agwuocha a seventeen year student in Kano captures the state of palpable fear as she said that *“We are afraid of Boko Haram. Daddy and Mummy keep awake all night in case the attackers decide to invade our home. They would lock all the doors tightly, pray all Night and ask us to sleep. But we never can, for we don’t know what will happen next... They said we would soon go home, so we are waiting”* (Egburonu et al, 2012:20). This cannot but worsen refugee and internally displaced problem in Nigeria.

Moreover, the insecurity also has the tendency to breed religious unrest because of multitude of attacks on churches and of recent on Muslim prayer grounds. Miscreants elsewhere can hide under the banner of Boko Haram and use the opportunity to further perpetrate havoc. The inability of government to addressing the challenges led to the general belief that everybody needs to provide for his or her security coverage and this will further compound the problem associated with proliferation of light arms (Oche, 2008). This position agrees with Raleigh (2011) that:

Severe political instability – civil wars, genocides and politicides – leads to increases in international migration and internally displaced persons, those conclusions are further interrogated to find that economic and social vulnerabilities can be equally critical factors in shaping movements from conflict zones.

This situation informed Eze (2012) to take a hard look at developments in the country concludes that *it is a mixed bag of darkness, insecurity and glimpse of hope for the future of Nigeria* provided there is honest commitment to the challenges posed by the sect.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

Though Nigeria today contends with the issue of Boko-Haram, and high level of insecurity, Iroko (2011) observed that we cannot be sure what will happen tomorrow. The nation ought to have learnt from the multitude of conflicts in Nigeria to be proactive and stop acting as an arm chair theorist on grave issues of national security that consistently threatens the corporate existence of Nigeria and renders the nation relatively economically impotent. While the government cannot fold his hands in the face of monumental destruction of lives and property, the prolonged attacks by the sect is a reflection that the nation has not learnt or develop the strategy to cope with homeland security such as was done in the US after the September 11 attack. Mohammed (2011) added that violent uprisings in Nigeria are ultimately due to *“the fallout of frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment”*.

The study therefore concludes that the current high level of insecurity in Nigeria is not insurmountable given an objective analysis of the causative factors and adoption of correct institutional mechanisms to address the multi- dimensional issues involved. Such issues apart from those reflected in Mohammed (2011) above include the inability to mobilize the masses to support government measures in order to curb the insurgence as every fact point in the direction that the sect enjoys the support of high and low disgruntled elements particularly in the north. The unsolicited support was easily given to the sect because of the manner the insurgence was

approached like declaration of war that equally leave the members of the public to suffer from the sect as well as the military that ought to protect them. The study further conclude that the near absolute silence of prominent Northern traditional rulers until of late and respected individuals and their inability to call their subjects to order believing that they are respected by their subjects spoke volume. The study in addition concludes that the failure of government to resolve all the issues associated with Boko-Haram insurgency may equally lead to non-Muslim elements in the south that are frustrated with general hardship in the nation to hide under the banner of Boko-Haram to unleash terror in the south. This might lead to unimaginable crises that the result that might shake the very foundation of the corporate existence of Nigeria.

There might be multi- dimensional approaches to finding lasting solution to social problems but a definite course of action is required that might not leave bad precedence and create the impression that government is confused. The removal of General Azazi and the replacement with Col.Sambo (Rtd) is a bad signal for sustainable peace since it was observed that the prominent Northerners were not comfortable with southern National Security Adviser. The implication is that when a particular geo-political entity is no longer comfortable with Mr President, the nation will encounter another round of violence which is not good for the corporate existence of Nigeria.

The study therefore recommends that the government must put up sincere measures to address the high rate of poverty and unemployment particularly by modernizing agriculture and provide incentives for industrialization such as in Malaysia, India and China. Poverty and unemployment make crime very attractive and irresistible to our teeming youth as an idle hand is the cheapest instrument in the hand of the devil. The study is conscious of the fact that the ideology of the sect is more important to them than the issue of worldly gains but equitable distribution of wealth by ensuring that people are gainfully employed may reduce the tendency of getting more youth recruited into the sect.

In addition, the experience of shortage and high cost of vegetable and food items in the south was a reflection of collective failure of agricultural programmes of the southern governments. These crops were produced through irrigation in the north while same could be planted three times yearly in the south without irrigation. The study argues that the south should relatively be self-sufficient in the production selected range of vegetables while that does remove interdependence nature based on seasons. The whole south need not experience shortage on account of the crisis or crop failure in the north. It is therefore recommended that the southern governors should embark on genuine agriculture development like it was done in the west during the First Republic to complement those of the north.

Moreover, the study recommends the review of the Federal Government approach to handling political or other related crises as peace approach is more successful than security approach. The adoption of peace approach will allow the government to understand the motivating force or reason behind actions and adopt measure ranging from consultation or peaceful intervention rather excessive militarization to suppress rather than resolve conflicts. The use of force with the intent of eliminating or suppressing opponents is like operating under security approach that often ends up in generating greater violence. Peace approach often wants to see the opponents as potential friends if the situation is carefully handled. Hence, government should adopt more of peace approach in resolving its internal political conflicts.

Also, the government should wake from its slumber and overcome the weak defence of not identifying the group leaders of Boko Haram as such argument is porous if the US can name Abubakar Sekiu, Abubakar Adam Kamar and Khalid al-Barnawi as global/foreign terrorists. The essence is for government to involve the cross section of Northern Emirs and prominent individuals in a genuine dialogue with the leaders of the group. This however does not mean that

government should shy away from meting out deserving punishment to those found guilty of criminal activities. In addition, the government should adopt an effective measure to ensure homeland security. This arrangement must evolve from the grass root believing that if every village or town is secured, the nation will in turn be secured. This implies that the traditional rulers and local notables in each local government within the nation must be effectively accommodated into local policing provided they were not imposed by the government on helpless communities.

The study further recommends a change in the mind-set of those in government as they often read ethnic, religious or political sentiment to any conflict. This was not done according to Dibia, (2012) because the political leaders passionately hate contrary views that tend to interrogate the status-quo. This situation is certainly not healthy for a federation with diverse religious, social, political, economic, cultural, educational and professional interests. Hence, the government must be tolerant of opposing views as the security of the nation is the collective responsibility of all irrespective of political, religious or ethnic affiliation.

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